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Abstract
We provide a simple model to investigate decisions about vertical separation. The
key feature of this model is that more than one input is required for the ¯nal product
of the downstream monopolist. We show that as the bargaining powers of independent
complementary input suppliers grow larger, the downstream monopolist tends to sep-
arate from its input units. The results are related to a visible di®erence between the
vertical structures of Japanese and US auto assemblers.
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1 Introduction
Vertical separation has become a widespread phenomenon in the industrialized world. Ex-
amples of industries where vertical separation is a key feature of the organization of pro-
duction abound: aircraft, cars, computers, audio/video systems, and so on. For example,
in the automobile industry, suppliers have a signi¯cant role in US, European, and Japanese
auto manufacturing and therefore in the quality of the ¯nal product (Richardson (1993)).
Japanese assemblers, especially, often spin o® parts development and manufacturing to inde-
pendently managed yet closely linked suppliers (Ahmadjian and Lincoln (2001)). Moreover,
automobiles are developed and manufactured by OEMs and their supplier networks, who
produce as much as 70 percent of the value of a vehicle. Consequently, the cost and quality
of a vehicle are functions of the productivity of a network of ¯rms working in collaboration
(Dyer and Nobeoka (2000)).
The degree of vertical separation (integration) varies between ¯rms although vertical
separation has become a widespread phenomenon. The automobile industry is a typical
example. Japanese auto assemblers are known to be substantially less vertically integrated
than their US counterparts (see, for instance, Cusumano and Takeishi (1991) and the
references therein). Large Japanese auto assemblers such as Toyota and Nissan rely on
suppliers for both design and manufacture of components traditionally produced in-house
by GM and Ford. As summarized in Dyer (1996), there are several explanations that a high
(resp. low) degree of vertical integration emerged in the US (resp. Japan). One explanation
is preference for vertical interactions among ¯rms. The US auto companies tend to eliminate
some negative e®ects from interactions with their trading partners. For instance, Perry
(1989) and Scherer (1980) point out managements' desire to grow and reduce dependency
on outside suppliers. Moreover, Emerson (1962) and Pfe®er and Salancik (1978) mention
that ¯rms lose power when they increase their dependency on outside suppliers. On the
other hand, Japanese cultural norms and values result in a high level of \goodwill trust" in
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Japan, which translates into cooperative inter¯rm relationships (Dore (1983), Sako (1991),
Hill (1995)). Another explanation of the di®erences between the US and Japanese in the
degree of vertical integration is based on the lack of an open market for corporate control
in Japan (Sheard (1994)) and the limitations of Japanese ¯nancial markets (Nishiguchi
(1994)).
Although those explanations summarized by Dyer (1996) sound plausible, we provide a
new strategic reason for the di®erence between the US and Japan. We think that a simple
key feature to explain those di®erences is that more than one input is required for the
¯nal products of those manufacturers. In automobile product development, the degree of
vertical separation (integration) for a single manufacturer is the consequence of hundreds
of individual procurement choices, ranging from simple supply contracts for commodity
components to complex arrangements for cutting-edge technology development (Novak and
Stern (2009)).
We provide a simple model to investigate decisions of vertical separation and show
several results that have not been explained in previous research (we mention the di®erence
between this model and those in related previous studies later). The key feature of this
model is that more than one input is required for the ¯nal product of the downstream
monopolist.1 This feature is consistent with the examples mentioned above. The model can
be also applied to other industries. For instance, in the aircraft industry two major ¯rms,
Airbus and Boeing, rely heavily on ¯rm-speci¯c inputs (e.g., engines, wings, horizontal
stabilizers) produced by independent manufacturers, and then sell their aircraft to airline
1 This setting is related to models with complementary suppliers (Economides and Salop (1992), Nalebu®
(2000), Baldwin and Woodard (2007), Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2007), and Maruyama and Minamikawa
(2009)). Those papers discuss how mergers among complementary suppliers appear and/or how those
mergers change equilibrium outcomes. Such complementary suppliers provide their products directly to
consumers. This setting is quite di®erent from ours. Note that the meaning of the term `vertical integration'
in these papers is di®erent from that in our paper. Although a merger among complementary suppliers is
called `vertical integration' in these papers, in our model the term indicates a merger between an upstream
and a downstream ¯rm.
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companies, which are ¯nal customers (Beelaerts van Blokland et al. (2008)).
The model structure is as follows. There is a downstream monopolist D that uses two
inputs; A and B. The inputs are produced by an independent upstream supplier A and a
production unit inside the downstream ¯rm D respectively. The wholesale price of input
A is determined by bargaining between the downstream ¯rm and the supplier. Under this
condition, we consider two cases: (1) the downstream ¯rm produces units of input B, (2)
the downstream ¯rm separates from its input production unit. The separated unit (supplier
B) supplies to the downstream ¯rm D to maximize its own pro¯t.2 We show that as the
bargaining power of the independent supplier A increases, the downstream monopolist tends
to separate from its input unit. A corollary of the result is that when the bargaining power
of the independent supplier A is large enough, vertical separation is always pro¯table for
the downstream monopolist.
Our paper shows that when the number of high-quality input suppliers that tend to have
stronger bargaining power is large, assemblers tend to withdraw from design and/or manu-
facture of other complementary components, as the Japanese assemblers did. Following the
discussion in Clark and Fujimoto (1991) and Clark (1989), we now explain that Japanese
suppliers indeed have strong bargaining power and/or provide high-quality product to auto
assemblers. Clark and Fujimoto (1991) and Clark (1989) examine the impact of \project
scope" in the global auto industry. The impact is a measure of the uniqueness of the part
played and the extent of development carried out by outside suppliers in project perfor-
mance. The authors found that 67% of Japanese projects were \black box," or developed
by suppliers, compared with 16% of US vehicles. They argue that the black-box system is
e®ective because the link between design and manufacturing is strong. They argue that the
high percentage of unique parts and high supplier involvement contributes to an observed
2 We assume that the downstream ¯rm cannot merge with supplier A. A more detailed discussion of the
assumption is provided in Section 2.
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Japanese advantage in project lead time and cost.3 This fact is consistent with our result:
As the number of high-quality independent input suppliers, which tend to have stronger
bargaining power, increases the downstream monopolist tends to separate from its input
production units.
Several researchers have investigated how the structure of vertical organizations is de-
termined in competitive environments (Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Gal-Or (1999), Choi
and Yi (2000), Chen (2001, 2005), Lin (2006), Arya et al. (2008), Matsushima (forthcom-
ing)). Although these papers consider downstream competition to derive results for vertical
separation, we show that vertical separation is pro¯table even with only one downstream
¯rm. An exception is Laussel (2008) who explicitly incorporates complementary inputs in
an attempt to examine why vertical integration does not occur. Besides several di®erences
in the setup (which we will mention later), the present paper di®ers from Laussel (2008)
as our focus is primarily on the relation between the degree of vertical separation and
procurement conditions.
In a broad sense, since the seminal work by Coase (1937), the problem of vertical
integration/separation has long been discussed by many researchers in the transaction-
cost-based approach. The related papers mainly deal with well-known hold-up problems
that illustrate the underinvestment hypothesis (e.g., Grout (1984) and Tirole (1986)). Coase
(1937) suggested that transaction costs might be avoided or reduced via other organizational
structures, and Klein et al. (1978) and Williamson (1979) suggested vertical integration
as an organizational response. The focus of this approach has been on comparing costs
internal to a transaction, between organizing the transaction within a ¯rm or through the
market.4 Complementary to the transaction-cost based approach, this paper emphasizes
3 Many researchers also point out that Japanese suppliers have superior technology, which contributes
to better performance by Japanese automakers (see Hemmert (1999) and the references therein).
4 Using the property rights approach to address the question of whether vertical integration can escape
the hold-up problem, Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) considered how a particular
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the importance of incorporating multiple inputs into the standard models with vertical
relations.
The model setup is somewhat similar to those in the literature on patent pools although
the motivations of these papers are quite di®erent from ours (Lerner and Tirole (2004),
Kim (2004), and Schmidt (2008)). These papers discuss how vertical integration and/or
patent pools (alliances among patent holders) alter the prices of patented inputs. However,
the incentives for vertical integration between upstream and downstream ¯rms are not
discussed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the model.
Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 extends the basic model. Section 5 brie°y discusses
the relation between our results and the di®erences between US and Japanese automakers.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The model
Consider a downstream monopolist D that uses two inputs, A and B. The inputs are pro-
duced by an independent upstream supplier A and a production unit inside the downstream
¯rm D, respectively. The wholesale price of input A is determined by bargaining between
the downstream ¯rm and the supplier.
The demand for the product is linear:
p = 1¡Q; (1)
where p is the market price and Q is the output supplied by the downstream ¯rm. A unit
ownership structure a®ects the parties' exposure to hold-ups. Che and S¶akovics (2008) provided an excellent
brief survey of the hold-up problem. The topic of vertical foreclosure is also related to the problem of vertical
integration. The vertical foreclosure issue primarily concerns the relation between vertical integration and
the competitiveness of downstream ¯rms (e.g., Ordover et al. (1990) and Hart and Tirole (1990)). See also
O'Brien and Sha®er (1992), McAfee and Schwartz (1994), Gaudet and Long (1996), Ma (1997), Riordan
(1998), and Choi and Yi (2000). Rey and Tirole (2007) provide an excellent survey of the literature.
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of ¯nal product is made with one unit of input A and one unit of input B:
Q = minfqA; qBg;
where qi is the amount of input i (i = A;B). That is, the downstream ¯rm uses Leontief
production technology. The ¯rms incur no marginal cost for units of product.
In this paper, we consider two cases: (1) the downstream ¯rm produces units of input
B, (2) the downstream ¯rm separates from its input production unit. The separated unit
(supplier B) supplies to the downstream ¯rm D to maximize its own pro¯t (see Figure 1).
[Figure 1 here]
We now discuss two reasons for our assumption that the downstream ¯rm cannot merge
with ¯rm A. First, when ¯rm A is an essential input supplier, vertical integration between
¯rm A and a downstream ¯rm tends to be prohibited by antitrust authorities. In general,
downstream ¯rms compete, and they usually procure their inputs from common suppliers
(Ahmadjian and Lincoln (2001)), although we use a model with a downstream monopolist
to simplify the analysis. The common supplier in our model is ¯rm A, which supplies
essential inputs for the industry. In this situation, a vertical merger between ¯rm A and a
downstream ¯rm is generally prohibited by antitrust authorities because of the foreclosure
problem (Rey and Tirole (2007)). Second, we can regard ¯rm A as a labor union in
the downstream ¯rm. In standard oligopoly models with labor unions, each downstream
¯rm negotiates with its labor union, which maximizes the product of its wage level and
number of employees (see, for instance, Horn and Wolinsky (1988a,1988b), Davidson (1988),
Dowrick (1989), Mumford and Dowrick (1994), Naylor (2002), Lommerud et al. (2003),
and Lommerud et al. (2009)). The setting employed here is the standard one concerning
the objective function of labor union.5
5 The second explanation seems unsuitable in the case of US and Japanese auto assemblers discussed
in Section 5 because it is often recognized that US labor unions have stronger bargaining power than
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We assume that the input prices are determined through Nash bargaining. The solution
is input prices wA and wB such that wi is the Nash solution to the bargaining problem
between supplier i and the downstream ¯rm, given that both expect to agree upon the price
wj . That is, given wj , the bargaining problem between supplier i and the downstream ¯rm
is described by the payo® pairs BIi = f[wiqi; ¼D]jwi ¸ 0g and the disagreement point (0; 0),
where ¼D is the pro¯t of the downstream ¯rm. The solution is given by:
wi = argmax
wi
®i log[wiqi] + (1¡ ®i) log ¼D; (2)
where ®i 2 [0; 1] measures the bargaining power of supplier i relative to that of the down-
stream ¯rm. This is a departure from Laussel (2008) where each input supplier has the same
bargaining power. Needless to say, the case of ®A = ®B is a special case of our speci¯cation.
Moreover, we thoroughly investigate how procurement conditions of the downstream ¯rm
a®ect the decision about vertical separation (see Sections 3 and 4).
The game runs as follows. First, the suppliers and the downstream ¯rm negotiate the
wholesale prices wi (i = A;B).6 Second, given the wholesale prices, the downstream ¯rm
sets its quantity supplied.
3 Result
We ¯rst consider two cases: (1) the downstream ¯rm produces units of input B, and (2)
the downstream ¯rm separates from its input production unit. We then compare the two
cases.
Japanese ones. However, as mentioned in Section 4, the existence of independent input suppliers including a
labor union in itself triggers the emergence of other vertically separated input units. Therefore, the second
explanation is plausible in the case of US and Japanese auto assemblers.
6 We only consider the case in which each upstream ¯rm uses a simple linear price contract. Even though
those upstream ¯rms use two-part tari® contracts, the essence of our main result does not change.
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3.1 No vertical separation
In this subsection, the downstream ¯rm has the input production unit that makes input B.
Given the wholesale price wA, the maximization problem of the downstream ¯rm is
max
Q
(1¡Q¡ wA)Q:
The ¯rst-order condition leads to
Q = qA =
1¡ wA
2
; ¼D =
(1¡ wA)2
4
:
As mentioned earlier, the wholesale price wA is determined through Nash bargaining
(see (2)). Applying the maximization problem in (2) to this situation, we have
wNA =
®A
2
; ¼NA =
®A(2¡ ®A)
8
; ¼ND =
(2¡ ®A)2
16
; (3)
where the superscript `N' denotes the equilibrium outcome in which the downstream ¯rm
does not separate. As the bargaining power of supplier A increases, the wholesale price wA
and the pro¯t of supplier A increase.
3.2 Vertical separation
In this subsection, the downstream ¯rm separates from its input production unit, and
then receives inputs from suppliers A and B. Given the wholesale prices wA and wB, the
maximization problem of the downstream ¯rm is
max
Q
(1¡Q¡ wA ¡ wB)Q:
The ¯rst-order condition leads to
Q = qA = qB =
1¡ wA ¡ wB
2
; ¼D =
(1¡ wA ¡ wB)2
4
:
As mentioned earlier, the wholesale prices wA and wB are determined through Nash
bargaining (see (2)). Applying the maximization problem in (2) to this situation, we have
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the ¯rst-order conditions of the Nash bargaining problems:
2wA ¡ ®A + ®AwB = 0; 2wB ¡ ®B + ®BwA = 0: (4)
Solving the simultaneous equations, we have
wSA =
(2¡ ®B)®A
4¡ ®A®B ; w
S
B =
(2¡ ®A)®B
4¡ ®A®B ; w
S
A + w
S
B =
2(®A + ®B ¡ ®A®B)
4¡ ®A®B ; (5)
¼SA =
®A(2¡ ®A)(2¡ ®B)2
2(4¡ ®A®B)2 ; ¼
S
B =
®B(2¡ ®B)(2¡ ®A)2
2(4¡ ®A®B)2 ; ¼
S
D =
(2¡ ®A)2(2¡ ®B)2
4(4¡ ®A®B)2 ; (6)
where the superscript `S' denotes the equilibrium outcome in which the downstream ¯rm
separates. As the bargaining power of supplier A increases, wA increases but wB decreases.
The converse also holds. As the bargaining power of supplier B increases, wB increases
but wA decreases. Because the competition structure between the suppliers is strategic
substitute (see (4)), an increase in the wholesale price of supplier i leads to a decrease in
that of supplier j (i = A;B, j 6= i).
3.3 Comparison
We now compare the results in the previous two subsections. First, we compare the total
wholesale prices in the two cases. When the input unit is not separated (resp. separated),
the wholesale price is wNA (resp. w
S
A + w
S
B). The di®erence between them is
wSA + w
S
B ¡ wNA =
®B(2¡ ®A)2
2(4¡ ®A®B) ¸ 0: (7)
Except for the case in which ®B = 0, vertical separation increases per unit production
cost of the downstream ¯rm. This is related to the discussion in Cournot (1838). When
independent upstream ¯rms sell perfect complements, the total price of the complements
is ine±ciently higher because those upstream ¯rms do not internalize the double marginal-
ization problem. In fact, we can easily ¯nd that vertical separation decreases the pro¯t of
the downstream ¯rm:
¼SD ¡ ¼ND = ¡
®B(2¡ ®A)3(8¡ ®B(2 + ®A))
16(4¡ ®A®B)2 · 0: (8)
10
We now show the incentive to separate from an input production unit. To investigate
this incentive, we compare ¼DD + ¼
D
B in (6) with ¼
N
D in (3). The di®erence between them is
¼SD + ¼
S
B ¡ ¼ND =
®B(2¡ ®A)2(8®A ¡ (4 + ®2A)®B)
16(4¡ ®A®B)2 : (9)
From this equation, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The integrated downstream ¯rm has an incentive to separate its input pro-
duction unit if and only if
®B <
8®A
4 + ®2A
: (10)
We easily derive the corollaries of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 When supplier A has full bargaining power with respect to the downstream
¯rm (®A = 1), vertical separation is always pro¯table for the integrated downstream ¯rm.
Corollary 2 For any ®A(> 0), there exists ¹®B(> 0) such that for any ®B < ¹®B, vertical
separation is pro¯table for the integrated downstream ¯rm.
Roughly speaking, the equilibrium incentive of vertical separation might be reminiscent of
the term \divide and rule" (\divide et impera") which is an economic strategy of gaining
and maintaining power by breaking up larger concentrations of power into chunks that
individually have less power than the one implementing the strategy.
To explain the intuition behind Proposition 1, we compare wNA in (3) with w
S
A in (5).
The di®erence between them is
wSA ¡ wNA = ¡
®A®B(2¡ ®A)
2(4¡ ®A®B) · 0: (11)
Vertical separation induces supplier A to lower its wholesale price wA when ®A > 0 and
®B > 0. This is because upstream ¯rms do not fully exert monopoly power because of
the double marginalization problem mentioned above (Cournot (1838) and Sonnenschein
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(1968)). This diminishes the pro¯t of supplier A, and a portion of the monopoly pro¯t
of supplier A is transferred to supplier B through competition between the suppliers (see
Figure 2). In particular, if the bargaining power of supplier A is strong (®A is large), the
decrease in the wholesale price wA is large (see (11)).7 Note that because vertical separation
causes the standard double marginalization problem, it diminishes the quantity supplied
by the downstream monopolist from QN to QS (see Figure 2).
[Figure 2 here]
Robustness Using a setting similar to that in this section, we now discuss the robustness
of Proposition 1. This proposition states that when the bargaining power of supplier B is
weak, vertical separation tends to be pro¯table. We now slightly alter the basic setting
to show a similar result to Proposition 1. We suppose that potential suppliers are able to
supply input B at a constant marginal cost c. Supplier B has full bargaining power with re-
spect to the downstream ¯rm. When c is su±ciently low, supplier B sets its wholesale price
at c because of the Bertrand competition among them. The joint pro¯t of the downstream
and the separated upstream ¯rm (supplier B) is
¦ ´ [P (Q(wA(c) + c))¡ (wA(c) + c)]Q(wA(c) + c) + cQ(wA(c) + c);
where P (¢) is the price of the ¯nal product, Q(¢) is the quantity supplied by the downstream
¯rm, and wA(c) is the wholesale price set by supplier A. Note that when c = 0, this is
equal to the pro¯t when they are integrated. Di®erentiating the joint pro¯t with respect
7 We can easily show this using a partial derivative of wSA ¡ wNA . Di®erentiating wSA ¡ wNA with respect
to ®A, we have
@(wSA ¡ wNA )
@®A
= ¡®B(8(1¡ ®A) + ®
2
A®B)
2(4¡ ®A®B)2 · 0:
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to c, we have
@¦
@c
=¡ (w0A(c) + 1)Q(wA(c) + c) +Q(wA(c) + c) + cQ0(wA(c) + c)(w0A(c) + 1)
=¡ w0A(c)Q(wA(c) + c) + cQ0(wA(c) + c)(w0A(c) + 1):
When c converges to zero, this converges to ¡w0A(0)Q(wA(0)). This is positive if and only
if w0A(c) < 0 for any c. The condition seems to be natural. Firm A decreases its wholesale
price as the other (competitive) supplier sets a higher price equal to c.8
Proposition 2 Under a general (inverse) demand function P (¢), when c is su±ciently
small and w0A(c) < 0 for any c, vertical separation is pro¯table for the downstream and the
separated upstream ¯rm.
Potential suppliers It may be claimed that the result depends on the assumption that
no potential competitors of the suppliers exist. Even if there are potential substitutes for
the incumbent suppliers, our result holds true under some conditions. For instance, suppose
that potential suppliers are able to supply inputs A and B at constant marginal costs ¹wA
and ¹wB respectively. Those marginal costs are the upper bounds of the wholesale prices
set by the incumbent suppliers. In this setting, ®A is large and ¹wB is su±ciently small, so
vertical separation of supplier B from the downstream ¯rm tends to be pro¯table.9 The
reason why this holds is simple. Because ¹wB is the upper bound of the wholesale price wB
set by supplier B, a lower ¹wB is somewhat similar to the case in which supplier B has lower
bargaining power, which compels it to set a higher wB.
Production technology In this section, we assume that the production technology
of the downstream ¯rm is Leontief. Some may claim that Leontief technology is crucial
8 w0A(c) < 0 if wQ
00(w + c) + Q0(w + c) < 0 (this is a su±cient condition). This condition, of course,
includes the case in which the inverse demand function is linear.
9 The calculus is highly complex, and is available from the authors on request.
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to derive our result. We can show that a similar result can be derived if the production
technology of the downstream ¯rm is Cobb{Douglas (see Technical Appendix).10
4 Multiple suppliers
We extend the basic setting in the previous section. Consider a downstream monopolist
that requires N inputs. m inputs are produced by independent upstream suppliers Ii
(i = 1; 2; : : : ;m) respectively (m < N). The remaining inputs are produced by production
units inside the downstream ¯rm (Ii (i = m + 1; : : : ; N)). To simplify the analysis, we
assume that the wholesale prices of input Ii are unilaterally determined by the suppliers.11
The demand for the product is the same as in the previous section. The production
function is expressed by
Q = minfqi; q2; : : : ; qNg;
where qi is the amount of input i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; N). That is, the production technology of
the downstream ¯rm is Leontief. The ¯rms incur no marginal cost for units of product.
In this extended model, we consider the decision regarding the number of input pro-
duction units that are separated from the downstream ¯rm. We denote the number as
n.
Given the wholesale prices wi (i = 1; 2; : : : ;m + n), the optimal quantity supplied by
10 Thesmar and Thoenig (2007) also consider the situation in which vertical separation appears. They
show that an increase in the degree of vertical separation ampli¯es elasticity to demand shocks of ¯rms'
sales and employment. Moreover, by using French ¯rm-level data sets from 1984 to 1999, they show that the
theoretical results are consistent with their empirical results. In their model, the monopoly downstream ¯rm
uses two inputs and has Cobb{Douglas production technology. When one input division is separated, the
separated supplier and the downstream ¯rms enter into a nonlinear price contract. Moreover, the property
of the input is di®erent from that in our model. These di®erences lead to the di®erent results in their paper.
11 After we show the result in this section, we brie°y mention the case in which each independent supplier
has a di®erent bargaining power.
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the downstream ¯rm is
Q =
1¡Pm+ni=1 wi
2
:
The maximization problem of supplier i is
max
wi
¼Ui = wi
1¡Pm+ni=1 wi
2
:
The ¯rst-order conditions of the suppliers lead to
wi =
1
1 +m+ n
; ¼D =
1
4(1 + n+m)2
; ¼Ui =
1
2(1 + n+m)2
: (12)
The joint pro¯t of the downstream and n suppliers (¼J) and the partial derivative of ¼J
with respect to n are
¼J ´ ¼D + n¼Ui = 2n+ 14(1 + n+m)2 ;
@¼J
@n
=
m¡ n
2(1 + n+m)3
:
¼J is maximized n = m if 2m · N , otherwise n = N¡m. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The optimal number of production units to be separated from the monopoly
downstream ¯rm is m if 2m · N , otherwise N ¡m.
This proposition means that as the number of independent complementary input suppliers
increases, the downstream ¯rm tends to separate from its input production units. We
now discuss the intuition behind this conclusion. As mentioned earlier, an increase in the
number of input suppliers leads to an increase in the sum of the wholesale prices (the e®ect
of double marginalization). An additional increase in the sum of wholesale prices, however,
decreases as the number of input suppliers increases.12 Therefore, in our model, given that
many independent input suppliers exist, a separation of an input unit does not diminish
the quantity supplied by the downstream ¯rm. In other words, the double marginalization
12 This is somewhat similar to the standard Cournot quantity setting model. In this model, while an
entry of a ¯nal product ¯rm decreases the price, the additional contribution of the entry to the decrease in
price becomes smaller as the number of existing ¯rms increases.
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problem stemming from a separation is not severe. On the other hand, separation of an
input unit decreases the sum of the wholesale prices set by the other input suppliers. This
is somewhat similar to the \business stealing e®ect" in the standard Cournot model (Tirole
(1988)). The reduction of the sum and the additional pro¯t of the separated input unit
bene¯t the group of the downstream ¯rm and the separated unit. When the number of
independent suppliers is large, the latter bene¯t dominates the former cost. When the
number of separated units is greater than one, an additional separation of an input unit
has a negative e®ect on the group of the downstream ¯rm and the separated units. The
additional separation reduces the pro¯t(s) of the other separated unit(s) because of the
business stealing by the additional unit. In other words, pro¯t cannibalization among the
separated units appears. This cannibalization diminishes the incentive to separate input
units from the downstream ¯rm. In this model, when the number of separated input units is
equal to that of independent complementary input suppliers, the positive and the negative
e®ects of vertical separation are balanced out.13
Remark 1 Note that, we have assumed that each upstream supplier has full bargaining
power. When each upstream supplier has di®erent bargaining power, the downstream ¯rm
separates at least one input unit if and only if
2
Ã
1 +
mX
i=1
®i
2¡ ®i
!
mX
i=1
®i
2¡ ®i > ®j ;
where ®i is the bargaining power of independent supplier i (i = 1; 2; : : : ;m) and ®j is
the bargaining power of the separated input unit. The left-hand side of the inequality is
increasing in each ®i (i = 1; 2; : : : ;m). As the number of independent suppliers and/or
the bargaining power of each independent supplier increase, the downstream ¯rm tends to
separate from its input production unit.
13 Novak and Stern (2009) empirically show a similar tendency that the probability of vertical integration
for each automobile system increases in share of other systems that are vertically integrated.
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Remark 2 We have considered one-shot games concerning the decision of vertical sep-
aration. If we consider the following story, Proposition 3 slightly changes. Initially, the
downstream ¯rm, m independent suppliers, and many potential buyers of the downstream
¯rm's input production units exist. The downstream ¯rm has an opportunity to sell its
production units to buyers in each period. There is no time discount. In this case, the
agents anticipate subsequent opportunities of vertical separation. As mentioned earlier,
given the existence of independent input suppliers, the downstream ¯rm has an incentive
to sell its input units. As the number of outside suppliers increases, the incentive becomes
stronger. Therefore, each agent can anticipate that the downstream ¯rm has an incentive
to sell its production units completely. This case is the worst for each upstream supplier
because the pro¯t of each supplier is decreasing in n (see (12)). Potential buyers anticipate
the pro¯t of each suppliers as follows:
¼U =
1
2(1 + (N ¡m) +m)2 =
1
2(1 +N)2
:
This is also the willingness to pay of each buyer. The downstream ¯rm's maximization
problem is
max
n
1
4(1 + n+m)2
+ n£ 1
2(1 +N)2
:
The solution depends on the exogenous values m and N .14 Fortunately, we can say that
there are at most two candidates to be the optimal solution: n = 0 and n = N ¡m. We
can easily show that the downstream completely sells its input production units if and only
if N < m(3 + 2m). The main massage of Proposition 3 does not so change. That is, as
the number of independent complementary input suppliers increases, the downstream ¯rm
tends to separate from its input production units.
14 The ¯rst-order condition is
(m+ 1)3 ¡ (N + 1)2 + n(3(m+ 1)2 + 3(m+ 1)n+ n2)
2(N + 1)2(1 +m+ n)3
:
This is monotonically increasing in n. The second-order condition is positive. That is, the objective function
is a convex function of n.
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5 Discussion
We have shown that when independent suppliers have greater bargaining power and/or
when the number of independent suppliers is large, a downstream ¯rm tends to separate
from its input production units.
We believe that the di®erence between Japanese and US auto manufacturers is a suitable
example of our results. Moreover, we suggest that our paper provides a new theoretical
insight into those di®erences. From our results, we make the following prediction. When the
number of high-quality input suppliers that tend to have stronger bargaining power is small,
assemblers tend to produce other complementary components in-house, as US assemblers
did. The converse also holds true. When the number of high-quality input suppliers is
large, assemblers tend to separate from design and/or manufacture of other complementary
components, as Japanese assemblers did.
Relying on the survey provided by Cusumano and Takeishi (1991) and the discussion in
Richardson (1993) and Novak and Eppinger (2001), we now propose that Japanese suppliers
truly have strong bargaining power and/or provide high-quality product to auto assemblers.
More than two decades ago, Japanese auto manufacturers bene¯ted from signi¯cant cost
advantages over their US competitors. A visible di®erence between Japanese and US auto
assemblers is their vertical structures concerning supplier relations. Japanese auto assem-
blers are known to be substantially less vertically integrated than their US counterparts.
Large Japanese auto assemblers such as Toyota and Nissan rely on suppliers for both de-
sign and manufacture of components traditionally produced in-house by GM and Ford.
Cusumano and Takeishi (1991) discuss several di®erences among the US and the Japanese
automakers, including (1) number and type of suppliers; and (2) pricing practices.15 We
15 For the other di®erences of supplier{manufacturer relationships among US and Japanese automakers,
they list the following: role in product development, quality management, length and stability of relation-
ships, and information exchanges and suggestions.
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¯rst consider the number of suppliers and the types of suppliers. The Japanese automobile
industry tends to be organized in a pyramid structure. Suppliers that directly negotiate
with automobile assemblers also have their own suppliers. These sub-suppliers also have
their own suppliers. As a result, hierarchies of suppliers (a pyramid of suppliers) are or-
ganized. In contrast, US automakers seem to buy more lower-level components and have
several independent suppliers for each component. Hence, Japanese automakers negotiate
with fewer suppliers than their US counterparts. In other words, Japanese automakers face
a small number of (collected) bigger suppliers. Hence, Japanese automakers have weaker
bargaining power than the US ¯rms. We now consider pricing practices. US automak-
ers choose their suppliers by utilizing competitive bidding, while the Japanese automakers
utilize target pricing in which they help their suppliers to reach their targets. Hence, it is
di±cult for US suppliers to raise their prices. That is, US automakers have stronger bargain-
ing power; conversely, Japanese automakers have weaker bargaining power. Summarizing
the arguments, we conclude that there is a relationship between vertical integration and
automakers' bargaining power. When suppliers have stronger bargaining power, assemblers
and input production units tend to be vertically separated.
Moreover, Cusumano and Takeishi (1991) compare supplier type by ¯nancial a±liation
and country of origin (see also Dyer (1996)). In their paper, the data indicate that 50%
of the major suppliers for the US automakers were internal parts divisions while 45% were
independent US suppliers; 5% (1 supplier) was from West Germany.16 For the Japanese
automakers responding to the survey, a mere 7% of their suppliers were in-house divisions;
33% were a±liated ¯rms (de¯ned as minimum 20% equity ownership) and nearly 60% were
independent.17 As mentioned in the introduction, Clark and Fujimoto (1991) and Clark
16 The sample size is relatively small. They do not provide statistical tests.
17 They conclude that these numbers appear consistent with previous reports of higher levels of vertical
integration for US automakers in contrast to more outside suppliers for the Japanese. The responses from
the transplants resembled the Japanese in the low level of vertical integration, but with far more reliance
on US suppliers.
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(1989) found that Japanese suppliers have superior technologies that enable Japanese au-
tomakers to produce high-quality products (see also Hemmert (1999)). To avail themselves
of the large number of independent suppliers that have superior technology, Japanese au-
tomakers may separate from their input production units, and these units may then be
operated as a±liated suppliers. This organizational structure is quite di®erent from that
of US automakers.
6 Concluding Remarks
We provide a simple model to investigate decisions of vertical separation and show several
new results that have not been explained in previous research. The key feature in this
model is that there is more than one input required to produce the ¯nal product of the
downstream monopolist. This feature is consistent with the organizational structures in the
aircraft, automobile, and computer industries. We show that as the bargaining power of the
independent supplier increases, the downstream monopolist tends to separate from its input
unit. A corollary of this result is that when the bargaining power of the independent supplier
is su±ciently large, vertical separation is always pro¯table for the downstream monopolist.
We also show that as the number of independent complementary input suppliers increases,
the downstream monopolist tends to separate from its input production units. The results
are related to a visible di®erence between the vertical structures of Japanese and US auto
assemblers.
From our results, we have a testable hypothesis for vertical structures: the larger the
number of independent suppliers that have superior skills, the larger the number of sepa-
rated input units from assemblers. A rigorous empirical test is needed to show whether the
prediction is plausible or not. This is a consideration for future research.
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Technical Appendix
We now consider the case in which the technology function of the downstream ¯rm has
a Cobb{Douglas form, Y = q1=2A q
1=2
B . Given the wholesale prices wA and wB, when the
downstream ¯rm produces the amount of Q, it solves the following minimization problem:
min
qA;qB
wAqA + wBqB s:t: Q = q
1=2
A q
1=2
B : (13)
From the problem, we have the following equation:
qA =
µ
wB
wA
¶1=2
Q; qB =
µ
wA
wB
¶1=2
Q:
When the downstream monopolist produces the amount of Q, the production cost is
C(Q) ´ 2w1=2A w1=2B Q: (14)
From the maximization problem of the monopolist, the optimal quantity supplied is
Q¤ =
1¡ 2w1=2A w1=2B
2
: (15)
The objective functions of the upstream units are described as follows:
¼A =
(wA ¡ c)(1¡ 2w1=2A w1=2B )
2
; ¼B =
(wB ¡ c)(1¡ 2w1=2A w1=2B )
2
: (16)
The optimization problems lead to
wA = wB =
1 + c
3
; ¼SD + ¼
S
B =
(1¡ 2c)2
12
: (17)
When the downstream ¯rm integrates upstream unit B, wB = c. From ¯rst-order
condition yields
wA =
1 + 6c2 +
p
1 + 12c2
18c
; ¼ND =
1
36
µ
¡3 +
q
2[1 + 6c2 + (1 + 12c2)1=2]
¶2
: (18)
By plotting ¼SD+¼
S
B¡¼ND , we have the following ¯gure. Numerically solving ¼SD+¼SB¡
¼ND = 0 for c, we obtain c = 0:5. Because ¼
S
D + ¼
S
B ¸ ¼ND , vertical separation is pro¯table
for the integrated downstream ¯rm (see Figure A1).
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